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ESSAY 1: THE QUALITY OF CORPORATE GOVERACE AD THE 
LEGTH IT TAKES TO REMOVE A POOR-PERFROMIG CEO. 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
In this paper, we investigate the effects of internal corporate governance on the 
length it takes to remove a CEO after the initial sign of poor firm performance.  
We find that firms that have a better quality of internal corporate governance are 
quicker to remove poor-performing CEOs. This result persists after controlling for 
other factors that might influence the CEO removal decision. 
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1. Introduction 
Empirical  evidence suggests that the quality of a firm’s corporate 
governance impacts its decision to terminate a poor performing CEO (e.g., 
Weisbach (1988), Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Jensen 
(1993), Shivdasani (1993), Ofek (1993), Denis and Denis (1994), Denis, Denis and 
Sarin (1995); Mikkelson and Partch (1996), Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani 
(1996), Yermack (1996), Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996), Mikkelson and 
Partch (1997)), Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997); Perry (2000), Faleye (2003), Maury 
(2006), Kato and Long (2006), and Conyon and He (2008)). Pursuing the same line 
of research, we posit in this paper that a firm with a better quality of governance 
mechanisms will likely be quicker to terminate its CEO after the initial sign of 
poor firm performance.  Specifically, we test the hypothesis that the better the 
quality of corporate governance in place, the shorter is the time taken by the firm 
to get its poor-performing CEO removed. 
Based on the existing literature on corporate governance, we employ, along 
with some control variables, a group of proxies that reflect the quality of corporate 
governance system. The proxies include fraction of outside directors on board, 
board size,  level of managerial ownership, levels of holdings by CEO, levels of 
holdings by controlling shareholder, and the magnitude of incentive compensations 
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to outside directors.  We use three proxies to measure firm performance:  ROA 
(return on assets), ROE (return on equity), and M/B (market-to-book).   
Our sample consists of S&P 500 firms in which involuntary CEO turnovers 
occur from during the 2004-2011 period. We compute the length by measuring the 
number of quarters it takes for such a turnover to take place subsequent to the 
firm’s first poor performance during the tenure of the CEO in question. This 
sample selection process might induce a bias when interpreting results as   it allows 
one to observe only those firms that actually fire their CEOs but not the ones that 
choose  not to take such an actions in spite of the poor performances. To address 
this problem known as incidental truncation, we employ Heckman’s two step 
procedure. The first step in this procedure is to apply a probit model to the whole 
population 500 firms. The second step applies the least square estimates to  the 
selected sample (i.e., firms that actually remove their CEOs).  
Consistent with the hypothesis, we find that a firm with a better quality of 
governance is quicker to fire its poor-performing CEO.  Although several studies 
examine the linkage between CEO firings and good system of corporate 
governance, we contribute to literature by  relating corporate governance quality to 
the speed at which a poor-performing CEO is removed.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
pertinent literature, while Section 3 describes the sample, testing models, and 
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methodology. Section 4 presents results supported by robustness checks and 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Why do CEOs get removed? 
Why do firms remove CEOs? This question has been broached by 
researchers. In this paper, we present three, not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
explanations in answer to the question. They are information asymmetry between 
the CEO candidate and the board, sociopolitical forces, and poor firm performance.  
Rijck (2011) suggests information asymmetry that exists at the time of hiring 
the CEO is  a reason for firing CEOs when the asymmetry is subsequently 
removed.  In this construct, the board is the principal, and the potential CEO 
candidate is the agent. The candidate will do everything to fit the profile for the 
position and exaggerate his or her personality traits that are positive. The candidate 
has the incentive to hide information that might hinder the suitability of his 
candidacy. Such information, which can be highly relevant to the board for the 
decision-making process, is kept from the board. The resulting information 
asymmetry leads to the initial hire and, upon removal of information asymmetry, 
subsequent fire of the CEO.   
Fredrickson et al (1988) propose a model (figure 1) suggesting that the 
board's actions can be explained by several sociopolitical forces, dealing with 
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interpersonal relations, coalitions, and power. Four such forces appear critical-(a) 
the board's expectations and attributions, (b) the board's allegiances and values, (c) 
the availability of alternative candidates for CEO, and (d) the power of the 
incumbent CEO. Therefore, the event of dismissal can be explained best by using a 
combination of social and political forces, not simply by considering 
 
 
Figure 1: A model of CEO dismissal 
whether it is rational for the organization to remove or retain executives associated 
with a given level of organizational performance. It should be emphasized that the 
four sociopolitical forces, along with organizational performance, operate in a 
ceteris paribus manner to affect the likelihood of dismissal. For example, the 
 5 
poorer the firm's actual performance, the greater the incumbent's power must be in 
order to keep his or her job. Similarly, the stronger the board's allegiance to the 
CEO, the more abundant the pool of possible replacements must be for the board to 
consider dismissal, and so on. None of the forces operates alone, although one 
extreme condition (e.g., high expectations of the board or a very powerful 
incumbent) may create the appearance that the other forces do not matter. 
The third category of explanations focuses on the sub-par firm performance 
when the incumbent CEO at its helm. In the next subsection, we survey this 
literature. 
2.2. On the linkage between poor performing firm and dismissal of its CEO 
The linkage between forced termination of CEOs and their subpar 
performance has been established in several studies. , including  McEachern 
(1975), Salancik & Pfeffer (1980), James & Soref (1981), Coughlan and Schmidt 
(1985), Brickley et al. (1988); Weisbach (1988); Warner, Watts, and Wruck 
(1988), Morck et al. (1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990); Denis, Denis and 
Sarin (DDS) (1995); Borokhovich et al (1996); Yermack (1996); Denis, Denis and 
Sarin (1997); Parrino (1997), Huson (2000) ; Perry (2000); Maury (2006); Kato 
and Long (2006); Conyon and He (2008)).   
Parrino (1997) document negative relation between firm performance and 
the probability of forced chief executive officer (CEO) turnover, Coughlan and 
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Schmidt (1985) and Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) provide supports by 
showing that poor performance is associated with CEO turnover. These studies 
discuss about the board’s effectiveness in replacing CEO following poor firm 
performance; however, these studies do not explore the differences in monitoring 
between the managers who serve as inside directors (full-time employees of the 
company) and directors who are outside directors (not full-time employees of the 
company, neither work for the corporation nor have extensive dealings with the 
company).  
Weibach (1988) examines how differently inside and outside directors 
behave in their decisions to remove top management. By testing on 485 publicly 
held corporation between 1977 and 1980, he argues that firms with outsider 
dominated boards (all firms in which at least 60% of the board are outsiders are 
designated outsider-dominated firms) are significantly more likely than firms with 
insider dominated boards (all firms in which outsiders make up no more than 40% 
of the directors are considered insider-dominated firms) to remove the CEO 
following poor firm performance. His findings suggest that outside directors are 
more likely than inside directors to fire CEO after poor firm performance because 
successors from outside the firm are more willing to break with the failed policies 
of their predecessors. He also argues that outsider-dominated boards tend to add to 
firm value through their CEO changes. This addition to firm value is largest when 
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the change is preceded by poor performance.  Similar results are reported in Maury 
(2006), Kato and Long (2006), Canyon and He (2008), Chen (2012).  
The relation between firm performance and top executive is also driven by 
many other factors such as board size (Yermack (1996)), ownership (Morck et al 
(1988), DDS (1997), Kato and Long (2006), Conyon and He (2008)), director 
compensation (Perry (2000). This relation is also affected by takeover market 
which is reported in Mikkelson and Partch (1997) and Hadlock and Lumer (1997). 
This evidence suggests that top managers face reduced disciplinary pressure in 
periods where there is less takeover activity.   
The association between CEO turnover and firm performance increases 
during the recession than boom time. A related study by Jenter and Kanaan (2008) 
tests the first prediction that the increased probability of CEO dismissals in 
recessions should be concentrated on underperforming CEOs. Underperformance 
in bad times reveals low CEO skills or a lack of the specific skills required to 
succeed in bad times, and thus leads to the CEO’s dismissal. They test this idea by 
estimating whether the sensitivity of CEO turnover to peer performance depends 
on whether a CEO underperforms or outperforms the benchmark. The result shows 
that the marginal effects of peer performance on CEO dismissals separately for 
underperformers and for out performers. They conclude that the peer performance 
effect on CEO turnovers is driven by boards being much more likely to remove 
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underperforming (but not outperforming) CEOs in bad times than in good times. 
The closely related second prediction is that CEO turnover should be more 
sensitive to firm specific performance in recessions than in booms. They found that 
the effect of firm-specific performance on CEO turnover is smallest when industry 
performance over the prior two years was high, and is largest when industry 
performance was low. 
Similar evidence that CEO turnover is negatively associated with firm 
performance also appears in Australia (Suchard et al (2001)), Belgium (Renneboog 
(2000)), Britain (Conyon (1998), Conyon and Florou( 2002)), and China (Conyon 
and He (2008), Kato, and Long (2006)). 
3. Sample, Data, and Methodology 
3.1. Sample 
Our sample originates from the S&P 500 firms covering the 2004-2011 
periods. The firms with CEO turnovers are then identified by consulting with the 
ExecuComp database. The resulting lists of CEO turnovers are then cross-checked 
with the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and Wall Street Journal Index (WSJI) to 
confirm the dismissal announcement date as well as to ascertain the stated reason 
for dismissal. 
We classify all CEO turnovers into two categories: voluntary CEO turnovers 
and involuntary CEO turnovers based on the reasons given by the firm. A CEO 
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change is considered as a voluntary CEO turnover when it occurs due to planned 
succession, retirement, voluntary resignation, stepping down, bad health, death, or 
interim replacement. An involuntary turnover occurs when a CEO is fired, forced 
to resign, or resigned due to scandal, accounting conflicts, and poor performance. 
This yields a final sample of 421 CEO turnovers, including 405 voluntary CEO 
turnovers and 16 involuntary CEO turnovers. 3.8% of the CEO turnovers are 
classified as involuntary. The annual average forced CEO turnover (Forced CEO 
turnover/Number of years) is 47.5% which is consistent with what reported in 
Taylor (2010) (48.85%, a sample of firms over 1970-2007) and that in Chen (2012) 
(41.4%, a sample of firms over 1995-2009). Out of the total 405 voluntary 
turnovers, only 58 are strictly voluntary in the sense these turnovers are not related 
to retirement, death, illness etc.  I refer  to these cases as  truly voluntary turnovers. 
3.2 Main Model 
Consistent with my hypothesis, given below is the general model I test in 
this paper. Controlling for other variables that might be relevant,  
LENGTH = f (quality of corporate governance) where the LENGTH is measured 
by the time it takes to fire a CEO after the first poor performance of the firm.   
3.2.1. Length Defined: Incidental Truncation 
The length it takes to replace CEOs after the initial sign of poor firm 
performance (LENGTH) is measured by the difference between the time the firm 
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shows the first sign of poor firm performance and the time when the CEO is 
dismissed. The length is observed only for a subset of population ---the firms that 
actually remove their CEOs consequent upon their first poor performance; it 
cannot be observed for firms that choose not to fire their CEOs. This common form 
of sample selection is called incidental truncation.  
The usual approach to incidental truncation is to use the Heckit method 
based on the work of Heckman (1976). First, we need to add an explicit selection 
equation to the population model: 
[ ]
, ( ) 0.............(1)
1 0 .....................................(2)
y x u E u x
s z v
β
γ
= + =
= + ≥
 
Where, s=1 if we observe y (the length), and zero otherwise. We assume that 
elements of x and z are always observed, we write 0 1 1 ... k kx x xβ β β β= + + +  and  
0 1 1 ... m mz z zγ γ γ γ= + + +  
The equation of primary interest is (1), and we could estimate β by OLS given a 
random sample. The selection equation (2), depends on observed variables, hz , and 
an unobserved error, v. A standard assumption, which we will make, is that z is 
exogenous in (1): ( , ) 0E u x z =  
In fact, for the following proposed methods to work well, we will require that x be 
a strict subset of z: any jx  is also an element of z, and we have some elements of z 
that are not also in x. 
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The error term v in the sample selection equation is assumed to be 
independent of z (and therefore x), we also assume that v has a standard normal 
distribution. We can easily see that correlation between u and v generally causes a 
sample selection problem. To see why, assume that (u,v) is independent of z. Then 
taking the expectation of (1), conditional on z and v, and using the fact that x is a 
subset of z gives ( , ) ( , ) ( ),E y z v x E u z v x E u vβ β= + = +  
Where ( , ) ( )E u z v E u v=  because (u,v) is independent of z. Now if u and v are 
jointly normal (with zero mean), then ( )E u v pv= for some parameterρ . Therefore, 
( , )E y z v x vβ ρ= +  
We do not observe v, but we can use this equation to compute ( , )E y z s  and then 
specialize this to s=1. We now have: 
( , ) ( , )E y z s x E y z sβ ρ= +  
Because s and v are related by (2), and v has a standard normal distribution, we can 
show that ( , )E v z s  is simply the inverse Mills ratio, ( )zλ γ  then s=1. This leads to 
the important equation 
( , 1) ( )....................(3)E y z s x zβ ρλ γ= = +  
Equation (3) shows that the expected value of y, given z and observability of y, is 
equal to xβ , plus an additional term that depends on the inverse Mills ratio 
evaluated at zγ . Remember, we hope to estimate β . This equation shows that we 
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can do so using only the selected sample, provided we include the term ( )zλ γ  as 
additional regressor. 
If 0, ( )zρ λ γ= does not appear, and OLS of y on x using selected sample 
consistently estimates β . Otherwise, we have effectively omitted a variable, ( )zλ γ , 
which is generally correlated with x. When does 0ρ = ? The answer is when u and v 
are uncorrelated. Because γ is unknown, we cannot evaluate ( )izλ γ  for each i. 
However, from the assumptions we have made, s given z follows a probit model: 
( 1 ) ( )...........................(4)P s z zγ= = Φ  
Therefore, we can estimate γ  by probit of is  on iz  using the entire sample. In a 
second step, we estimateβ . The procedure can be summarized as follows: 
(i) Using all n observation, estimate a probit model of is  on iz  and obtain the 
estimate hγ
⌢
. Compute the inverse Mills ratio, ( )i izλ λ γ=
⌢
⌢
for each i. (Actually, 
we only need these for the i with 1is = .) 
(ii) Using the selected sample, that is, the observations for which 1is =  (say, 
1n of them), run the regression of iy on ix , iλ
⌢
. The jβ
⌢
are consistent and 
approximately normally distributed 
We use t-statistic from the second step (ii) on iλ
⌢
 to test the hypothesis 0 : 0H ρ = . 
Under 0H , there is no sample selection problem. 
3.2.2. Measures of firm performance 
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Following Smith (1990), Denis & Denis (1995), Yermack (1996), Allgood 
and Farrell (2000), Anderson and Reed (2003), Dezso (2005), We employ three 
measures  of firm performance---Return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE) 
and market-to-book ratio (M/B).  ROA is defined as EBITDA over the book value 
of total assets, ROE is defined as EBITDA over total equity at the start of the year, 
and M/B as book value of assets plus market value of common stock less the book 
value of common equity divided by book value of total assets. Since operating 
income does not include taxes, dividends, or interest income received, or dividends 
paid to stockholders, it is argued to be a robust measure of changes in the operating 
performance of an organization  and less vulnerable  to managerial manipulation 
(Smith, 1990; Denis & Denis, 1995). In order to control for industry effects, we 
control for industry performance while measuring the firm performance. In so 
doing, we subtract the industry performance from the firm performance. The 
industry average is based on all firms that have the same 4-digit SIC code as the 
sample firm. 
In addition to the three measures of performance discussed above, we also 
use a fourth measure based on previous studies, including Yermack (1996) and 
Farrell (2002). This measure calculates surprise earnings and abnormal returns by 
examining performance changes from two years prior to turnover to two years after 
the turnover.  Surprise earnings are defined as the difference between the actual 
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return and forecasted return, while abnormal returns are calculated by two 
methods---actual returns minus market returns, and actual returns minus the return 
predicted by the market model. 
3.2.3. Initial sign of poor firm performance  
Several studies have documented that the average CEO tenure is between 6 
and 7 years. For instance, Kaplan and Minton (2008) place such  tenure to less than 
seven years based on  a sample of large U.S during the 1992-2005 period and  
Coates and Kraakman (2010) find  that the average tenure is 6.91 years (sample of 
S&P 500 from 1992-2004). Therefore, in this paper we will focus on a 7 year 
period prior to the CEO firing to identify the initial sign of poor firm performance. 
Initial sign is defined as the first time the firm performance is inferior to the 
industry performance.  
3.2.4. Factors affecting the efficacy of the corporate governance system 
3.2.4.1. Board Structure 
We focus on only three aspects of the board structure that have been shown to have 
implications for the effectiveness of the board. They are a) percentage of outside 
directors, b) board size, and c) CEO-Chairman duality. 
Percentage of outside directors on the board:  The board is the shareholders’ 
first line of defense against incompetent management. And, the board becomes 
more independent and therefore, more effective, with increasing representation by 
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outside directors. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that outside directors, who tend to 
be major decision-makers at other organizations, have incentives to signal to the 
labor market that they are experts in decision control by acting in shareholder 
interests. Outside directors increase the value of their human capital by 
strengthening their reputations as decision control experts. Inside directors, on the 
other hand, are more apt to be concerned about maintaining their current position 
in the firm. Existing literature supports this argument. For instance,  Weisbach 
(1988) reports that outside directors (directors who neither work for the 
corporation nor have extensive dealings with the company as outside directors) 
represent shareholder interests better than inside directors (directors who are full-
time employees of the corporation).  Weisbach  reports that firms with outsider 
dominated boards (all firms in which at least 60% of the board are outsiders are 
designated outsider-dominated firms) are significantly more likely than firms with 
insider dominated boards (all firms in which outsiders make up no more than 40% 
of the directors are considered insider-dominated firms) to remove the CEO 
following poor firm performance. He adds that outsider-dominated boards tend to 
add to firm value through their CEO changes and the addition to firm value is 
largest when the change is preceded by poor performance.  
Extending Weisbach’s (1988) line of reasoning, Borokhovich et al (1996) 
argue that the decision to fire a CEO after bad firm performance does not benefit 
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shareholders unless the board also appoints a more capable successor. They show 
that there is a positive relationship between the proportion of outside directors and 
the likelihood that an outsider is appointed CEO. In other words, outside directors 
are also more likely to fire a CEO with an executive from outside the firm since 
new CEOs from outside the firm appear to be perceived as more likely to alter firm 
policies in a way that benefits shareholders. Huson et al (2000) also support this 
point. They argue that successors from outside the firm are more willing to break 
with the failed policies of their predecessors. Based on the preceding discussion, 
we expect that there will be a negative relation between the length to fire a poor-
performing CEO and the percentage of outsider directors on board.  
Board size: The empirical work predominantly suggests that smaller board 
size is more effective than larger board size because the problems with 
coordination and processing overwhelm the advantages gained from having more 
people to draw on (Steiner (1971) and Hackman (1990)). Lipton and Lorch (1992) 
suggest that large boards can be less effective than small boards, and recommend 
limiting the size to seven or eight people in the board. Jensen (1993) reports that 
when a board gets beyond seven or eight members it is less likely to function 
effectively and easier to be controlled by the CEO. Yermack (1996) finds that a 
firm with smaller board is more likely to remove its CEO following a bad firm 
 17 
performance.
1
 To be consistent with Yermack (1996) and Dezso (2005), I measure 
board size as the number of members of the board of directors as of the annual 
meeting date during each fiscal year, and then take the natural log of each.. 
CEO-Chairman Duality: When CEO also serves as the Board Chairman, the 
role of the board in monitoring CEO actions is compromised, jeopardizing board 
independence (e.g., Palvia (2011), Goyal and Park (2002), Adams, Almerda, and 
Ferreira (2005)).  Other studies take the view that duality entrenches CEOs and 
adversely affects the firm performance (e.g., Dalton and Rechner, 1991)).
2
  We 
expect to find a positive relation between duality and the length of time it takes to 
fire the CEO. 
3.2.4.2. Ownership Structure 
CEO ownership: If a CEO is also a significant owner of the company, the 
probability of firing himself/herself after the poor firm performance dwindles due 
to conflict of interest (Denis et al (1997), Mikkelson and Partch (1997), Perry 
(2000), Coates and Kraakman (2007), and Coates and Kraakman (2010)), Thus, a 
                                                 
1
 Although the overwhelming majority supports the greater efficiency of the smaller board size, 
this opinion is not unanimous.  For example, Faleye (2003) do not find significant differences in 
the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance based on the board size. Faleye suggests that 
both small and large boards are likely to terminate the CEO when faced with significant and 
consistent deterioration in performance.   
2
Not all scholars view duality as having negative implications for the firm. These researchers 
argue that duality is merely a “natural result of succession process” and thus has no systematic 
impact on firm performance (e.g., Brickley, Jeffrey, and Gregg (1997), Adams et al (2005), and 
Chen (2012)).  Zajac and Westphal (1996) argue that the power of a board is decided by its 
tenure relative to that of the CEO.  It is reasonable to assume that duality alone will not 
significantly increase the power of a successor CEO over the board since the former is new to the 
CEO position.    
 18 
negative relation is expected between CEO ownership and CEO turnover. 
Consequently, the length it takes to fire the CEO gets higher as the ownership of 
the CEO in the firm increases. We calculate CEO percentage shareholdings by 
dividing the number of CEO shares by total shares outstanding. 
Insider (managerial) ownership:  Insider ownership has an important 
influence on internal monitoring mechanisms. Empirical work (for example, Ofek 
(1993), Denis and Denis (1994), Mikkelson and Partch (1996)) reports a negative 
relation between the managerial ownership and the rate of CEO turnover, 
suggesting that higher managerial ownership reduces the effectiveness of internal 
monitoring. To provide further evidence on whether equity managerial ownership 
affects internal monitoring mechanisms, Denis, Denis, and Sarin (DDS) (1997) 
allow the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance to vary with the 
levels of various managerial ownerships of 1,394 Value Line Investment Survey 
firms over the period 1985-1988.  Following Morck et al (1988), DDS classify 
managerial ownership into three categories: less than or equal to 5%, between 5% 
and 25%, and greater than 25%. Their results suggest that managerial ownership 
has a significant impact on the sensitivity of turnover to performance. The 
probability of turnover is negatively related to performance when managerial 
ownership is less than 5% and significantly less sensitive to performance when the 
managerial ownership is between 5% and 25%. Their overall findings are 
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consistent with the hypothesis that higher ownership partially insulates managers 
from internal monitoring mechanisms. We expect a positive relation between the 
degree of managerial ownership and the length taken to dismiss CEOs. We use 
ownership by all officers and directors as a proxy for managerial ownership.  
Managerial ownership is calculated by the number of all officers and directors’ 
shares divide by total shares outstanding. 
Block ownership by outsiders: DDS (1997) find that the negative relation 
between turnover and performance is significantly stronger in firms with higher 
outside block ownership.
3
 We expect that higher ownership by outside block-
holders  would lead to more effective corporate governance measures such as the 
time elapsed between poor performance and dismissal of the CEO would be 
shorter
4
. Consistent with Denis et al (1997), Mikkelson and Partch (1997), Perry 
(2000)), we calculate outside block holder ownership by dividing the number of 
outside block holder shares by total shares outstanding.  
3.2.4.3. Directors Compensation 
                                                 
3
 A block-holder is defined as the one who owns at least 5% of the firm’s shares and is not 
related to the top management team (or do not own shares over which managers have some 
voting authority). 
4
 However, the effect of outside block holders on the sensitivity of turnover to performance 
might not be as the sensitivity with respect to managerial ownership. The reason is that different 
outside block holders have different incentives to monitor managers. For example, Brickley et al 
(1988) argue that certain institutional investors with potential business relationships with a firm 
are more likely to align themselves with incumbent managers. Other institutions, lacking the 
potential for a business relationship are less likely to have their actions affected by the conflict of 
interest. 
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Since the early 1980’s, the proportion of outside directors receiving stock 
options and stock grants has increased dramatically. In a 1989 Conference Board 
Survey of 909 firms, Bacon (1989) finds that six percent of firms granted stock to 
outside directors and 14 percent granted stock options. In the 1997 Conference 
Board survey, the percentage of firms paying stock-based compensation to outside 
directors had increased to 84 percent (Worrell (1997)). In addition, Pearl Meyer 
and Partners (1996) report that the stock-based compensation paid to outside 
directors at the 200 largest industrial and service corporations increased from 2 
percent to 22 percent of directors’ total pay between 1985 and 1995.  
Stock or option grants are likely to complement the managerial labor market 
in providing outside directors with incentive to represent stockholder interest. 
Some researchers argue that firms can increase the monitoring of management by 
providing outside directors with a financial stake in the performance of the firm. 
For instance, firms can encourage outside directors to “think like shareholders” by 
compensating directors with incentive-based compensation. Perry (2000) reports 
that the likelihood of CEO turnover following poor stock performance is 
significantly greater when directors of independent boards (outside dominated 
board
5
) are given incentive-based compensations.  Following Perry (2000), we 
include a dummy equal to one when directors of independent boards receive 
                                                 
5
 The percentage of outsiders on the board is at least 60% . 
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incentive compensation, it is zero otherwise. We expect the relation between 
incentivized directors and the length of time it takes to fire the CEO to be negative.   
3.2.5. Control variables 
3.2.5.1. Number of subsidiaries 
Firm size has been used as a control variable in many studies related to CEO 
turnover. These studies show that firm size affects the relationship between firm 
performance and CEO turnover (see, for example, Warner et al (1988), Denis, 
Denis and Sarin (1997), Perry (2000), Huson et al (2001), and Dezso (2005)). 
These studies, in general, agree that smaller firms are more likely than larger firms 
to remove CEOs after poor firm performance. For example, Denis, Denis and Sarin 
(1997) document that CEO turnover following bad firm performance is 
significantly less likely in larger firms. In addition, (Parrino, 1997) finds that larger 
firms are more likely to appoint an insider to replace an outgoing CEO. A potential 
explanation for this empirical regularity is that smaller firms tend to have fewer 
senior managers that are qualified to replace the outgoing CEO and an outside 
candidate is more likely to be effective in a smaller, less complex organization.  
However, in this paper, we use number of subsidiaries as one of the control 
variables because it is more difficult to appraise the CEO’s contribution to the 
firm’s performance in a complex organization (many subsidiaries). We would 
expect the length (elapsed between poor performance and CEO firing) would be 
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positively related to the number of subsidiaries.  Number of subsidiaries is defined 
as the number of 4 digit subsidiaries for each firm.  
3.2.5.2. CEO tenure 
CEO tenure has been considered as a potential factor that influences the likelihood 
of turnover after poor firm performance in several studies (for example, Denis et 
al. (1997), Parrino (1997), Allgood and Farrell (2000), and Goyal and Park 
(2002)).  While Denis et al. (1997) find no significant relation between CEO tenure 
and CEO turnover after poor firm performance, Parrino (1997), Allgood and 
Farrell (2000), and Goyal and Park (2002) report a positive and significant 
association. In this paper, we expect the relation between tenure and the length of 
being fired to be negative and measure this variable in terms of the number of 
years a CEO has held the position.  
3.2.6. Expanded equation 
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where  
•LENGTH: is the time it takes to get CEOs replaced after the initial sign 
of poor firm performance  
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•Percentage of outside directors: number of outside directors divided by 
the number of directors of the board 
•Board size: log of number of members of the board of directors 
•Managerial Ownership: number of all officers and directors shares 
divided by total shares outstanding (%) 
•CEO Ownership: number of CEO shares divided by total shares 
outstanding (%) 
•Outside Block holder Ownership: number of outside block holder shares 
divided by total shares outstanding (%) 
•D1: is dummy variable that is 1 if the company uses incentive 
compensation for outside directors 
•D2: is dummy variable that is 1 if a CEO is also a chairman 
Number of subsidiaries, CEO tenure and D2: are control variables 
•CEO tenure: is measured by the number of quarters a chief executive 
had been in office 
•Number of subsidiaries: is measured by the number of 4 digit 
subsidiaries for each firm 
 
 
 24 
3.3. Data Sources 
Ownership and compensation is collect from ExecuComp database and Compact 
Disclosure. Board size and board composition data can be collected from 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Investors Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC) and Compact Disclosure. Stock returns data are obtained from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and accounting data from the Compustat 
database. We also require each company to have other data available besides CEO 
turnover between 1997 and 2011. 
3.4. Econometric model  
To be consistent with Huson et al. (2004) and Chen (2012), we use a two-step 
model developed in Heckman (1979)
6
 to deal with sample selection issue because 
some firms in the sample do not have involuntary CEO turnover until the end of 
the period 2004-2011. In the first step, we use probit model (6) to estimate the 
probability of removing CEOs and the inverse Mill’s ratio ( ˆiλ ): 
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where P is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if there is a forced CEO 
turnover in firms, and 0 otherwise. Other variables are defined in previous sections. 
                                                 
7
 See Heckman (1979) for details in section 3.2.1 
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In the second step, we estimate OLS model (7) with the ˆiλ  added as an 
independent variable. The ˆiλ  is supposed to capture the omitted variables in OLS 
regressions where data are censored (e.g., Heckman, 1979). 
0 1 2
ˆ* _ _ _ * ........................(7)iLogOfLength quality of corporate governance vπ π π λ= + + +
 
4. Results  
4.1. Summary statistics 
Table 1 shows a median company board has 10 directors, of which 80.02%  
is outside directors. While the percentage of independent director (the number of 
independent directors/board size) is high, the median percentage of inside directors 
(the number of inside directors on a board/board size) is only 19.05%. This board 
size is very close to recent years. The average size of S&P 500 boards is 10.8 
directors in 2008 and 2007, and 10.7 directors in 2005
7
. A median CEO has served 
on the board for 5.02 years. A median CEO age is 54.56 years which is close to 
CEO average age reported in Wall Street Journal. All officers and directors, CEO, 
outside block holders own 6.1%, 5.16%, 8.89%, respectively.  
                                                 
8
 Source: www.spencerstuart.com 
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Table 2 reports sample frequencies of reasons for CEO turnovers over the 2004-
2011 periods. Of all the 421 CEO turnovers identified in this study, 405 are 
classified as voluntary turnovers and 16 are classified as forced turnovers. The 
average annual rate (the annual number of turnovers/the number of firms) is 
10.53% similar to that reported in Wall Street Journal over the recent period. 
However, it is higher than the average annual bank CEO turnover rate 7.04% 
documented in Chen (2012) (a sample of firm in banking industry during 1995-
2009). The reason is because S&P 500 firms are more likely replace CEO than 
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firms in the banking industry. Table 2 shows that 19 turnovers due to planned 
succession, 164 turnovers due to retirement, 64 turnovers due to voluntary 
resignation, 126 turnovers due to stepping down, 6 turnovers due to bad health, 6 
turnovers due to death, 20 turnovers due to interim CEO replacement, 11 turnovers 
due to being forcing out, 2 turnovers comes from resignation due to scandal, 2 
turnovers comes from resignation due to accounting conflicts, and 1 turnovers 
comes from termination due to CEO poor performance. The percentage of internal 
CEO turnover replacement (72.21%) is higher than the percentage of external CEO 
turnover replacement (27.79%). In other words, firms are more likely replace their 
CEO internally. During these eight years, we identified 421 cases of CEO 
turnover; of these, 405 (96.2%) are voluntary and 16 (3.8%) are forced turnovers. 
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4.2. Market reaction to CEO turnover announcements 
In this section, we examine firm long-run abnormal stock performance around 
CEO turnovers with a sample of 421 CEO turnovers as described in previous 
section. Table 3 reports average abnormal stock returns over six window periods 
around the announcement [-Q7, -Q1], [-Q4, -Q1], [-Q1], [+Q1], [+Q1, +Q4], [+Q1, 
+Q7]. Following Chen (2012), stock returns are measured by a four factor model 
that includes the market risk premium (the spread between CRSP value-weighted 
 29 
market return and risk-free rate), SMB (the return spread between portfolios of 
small and big capitalization stocks), HML (the return spread between portfolios of 
high and low book-to-market stocks), and a momentum factor.  The market model 
parameters are estimated with data over the 24-month period seven quarters before 
the turnover announcement quarter.  
 
Table 3 suggests that firms with involuntary turnovers have sharper decrease in 
abnormal return compare with firms which do not. Furthermore, table 3 indicates 
that firms showing a sharp decrease in pre-turnover abnormal stock performance 
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during the [-Q7, -Q1], [-Q4, -Q1], and [-Q1] are more likely to remove CEO with 
outside successors.  
4.3. Firm performance changes around CEO turnovers 
4.3.1. Changes in return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) 
To be consistent with Chen (2012), we examine firm performance over the 
two periods around the CEO turnover announcement [-Q7, -Q1] and [+Q1, +Q7]. 
Firm performance can be measured by: unadjusted and industry-adjusted return on 
assets (ROA), unadjusted and industry-adjusted return on equity (ROE), and 
market-to-book ratio. In this section, we compare changes in return on assets 
(ROA = operating income/the book value of total assets) and return on equity 
(ROE= EBITDA/the book value of total assets) across turnover types (forced vs. 
voluntary) and replacement type (internal vs. external) in two post-turnover 
periods.  Changes in unadjusted ROA and industry-adjusted ROA are significantly 
higher in the case of forced turnover than in the case of voluntary turnovers 
(columns 1 and 2). It implies that purpose of changing in forced turnover is to 
improve firm performance. Table 4 also indicates that the poorer the firm 
performance, the higher the external CEO replacement (column 5 and column 4).  
For instance, both firms A and B have CEO replacement as result of poor firm 
performance, however firm B performs poorer than firm A. Therefore, firm B is 
more likely to replace a CEO with an outsider. In addition, outside directors tend to 
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outperform inside directors in the pre-turnover period, although not significantly.  
Unadjusted ROE and Industry-adjusted ROE in table 4 tell the same story.  
 
4.3.2. Changes in market-to-book ratio 
We report the percentage average changes in market-to-book ratio of 421 
turnovers for S&P 500 firms over the period 2004-2011 in the table 5. Again, 
market-to-book ratio is defined as book vale of assets plus market value of 
common stock less the book value of common equity over book vale of total 
assets. Table 5 implies that forced turnovers and external replacement are both 
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preceded by a significant decrease in market-to-book ratio (column 2 and 5). Table 
5 further suggests that with experiencing a significant decline in market-to-book 
ratio, firms tend to remove their CEOs and select an outside successor (column 5).  
 
4.4. Length vs. Quality of Corporate Governance 
We report results for probit model (6) and model (7) in column 1 and 
column 2 of Table 6. Table 6 indicates that the coefficients on percentage of 
outside directors are negative ((-0.03114) for model (6) and (-0.02145) for model 
(7), and significant (at 1% and 5% in the model (6) and (7), respectively); it 
suggests that there is a shorter length to remove CEOs after the initial sign of poor 
firm performance for firms with higher proportion of outside directors. This result 
is consistent with Weisbach (1988), Borokhovich et al (1996), Huson (2000), 
Maury (2006), Kato and Long (2006), Conyon and He (2008)). Outside directors 
are more likely motivated in removing CEOs by poor performance compared with 
inside directors.  
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Table 6 further reports coefficient on board size is positive and significant at 
5% in model (7). According to Lipton and Lorch (1992)), Jensen (1993) and 
Yermack (1996), smaller board sizes are more effective especially in the case of 
firing CEOs after poor performance. They argue that keeping boards small can 
help improve their performance since when firms have large boards they are less 
likely to function effectively.  
Coefficients on managerial ownership in both models are positive and 
significant (significant at 5% in the model (6) and 10% in the model (7)). It implies 
that there is a positive relationship between managerial ownership and the length to 
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get CEOs removed after the initial sign of poor firm performance. This suggests 
that higher equity managerial ownership partially insulates managers from internal 
monitoring mechanisms, which is also reported in DDS (1997) who find that 
higher levels of holdings by top managers decrease the sensitivity of turnover to 
performance, implying that higher CEO ownership will increase the length it takes 
to get the CEOs removed.  Coefficients on CEO ownership in both models (6) and 
(7) are positive and significant at 5% and 10%, respectively.  
There is a negative relationship between outside block holder ownership and 
the length to dismiss a CEO. The coefficient on outside block holder ownership is 
negative (-0.00231) and significant at 5% for model (6). Large equity stakes in the 
company provide block-holders an increased incentive to monitor management, 
resulting in higher performance-turnover sensitivities. Therefore, firms with higher 
outside block ownership are more likely to quickly terminate poor-performing 
CEOs. In the models (6) and (7), we also investigate the impact of incentive 
compensation for outside directors on the length on removing poor performing 
CEO. The results show that the length is significantly shorter when directors of 
independent boards (outside dominated board) receive incentive compensation 
than when they do not. Firms can increase the monitoring of the management team 
by providing directors with a financial stake in the performance of the firm.  
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 We also investigate the interaction between firm performance and incentive 
compensation for outside directors. Perry (2000) documents that the likelihood of 
CEO turnover following poor stock return performance is significantly greater 
when outside directors of the board receive incentive compensation than when they 
do not. Our result supports Perry (2000)
8
. Number of subsidiaries is one of many 
factors that affect the length of removing CEOs. Table 6 yields the expected result 
regarding the relationship between the number of subsidiaries
9
 and the length in 
removing the CEO. We find that in the sense that smaller firms tend to remove 
CEOs following poor firm performance faster than small firms, which is consistent 
with DDS (1997). The coefficient of log of number of subsidiaries is positive 
0.00528 and significant at 5% in model (6). 
Several papers report a positive and significant relationship between CEO 
tenure and CEO turnover (Parrino (1997), Allgood and Farrell (2000), and Goyal 
and Park (2002)). This implies a negative relation between the tenure and the 
length of dismissal. Consistent with this finding, we find a negative association 
between CEO tenure and the length. As regards CEO/chairman duality, we find a 
positive association between this factor and the length. This result is consistent 
                                                 
9
 Our result persists when we use ROE and abnormal returns as alternative measurements of firm 
performance. 
10
 We also use CEO gender and CEO age as control variables. The results tell us the same story 
that firm with better quality of internal corporate governance in place are quicker to replace their 
CEO following the poor firm performance. However, CEO gender does not have any effect on 
the length it takes to replace CEO following the poor firm performance, which is consistent with 
Hays et al (2011) 
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with that found in Palvia (2011), Goyal and Park (2002), and Adams, Almerda, and 
Ferreira (2005). The finding suggests that CEO/chairman duality jeopardizes board 
independence by increasing CEO power over the board. Coefficient on ˆiλ  is 
positive 0.00713 and significant at 5%. A simple test of selection bias is available 
from regression (7). We can use the usual t statistics on ˆiλ  as a test of 0: 20 =πH . 
Under H0, there is no sample selection problem. The coefficient on ˆiλ  has a very 
small t statistics (0.1175), so we fail to reject 0: 20 =πH , there is no evidence of a 
sample selection problem in estimating the length of removing CEOs.  
4.5. Robustness test 
There are a few firms in our sample in which the first poor performance is 
followed by a second one. In this section, we examine whether the length to 
terminate a CEO is shortened in firms where there are two successive poor 
performances. The main regression: 
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3D  is a binary variable, equals 1 if firm performance is inferior to the industry 
performance once, 0 otherwise. The other variables are defined as in the section 
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3.2.6. Using the same procedure Heckman two-step, overall finding suggests that 
the better the quality of internal corporate governance, the shorter is the time taken 
by the firm to get its poor performing CEO removed. In addition, firms 
experiencing poor performance more than once are more likely to remove their 
CEO faster.  
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5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of internal corporate governance on 
the length it takes to terminate CEOs after the initial sign of poor firm 
performance. Our sample consists of voluntary and involuntary CEO turnovers that 
occurred in the S&P 500 firm during 2004-2011. We investigate changes in firm 
performance proxied by three factors: ROA (return on assets), ROE (return on 
equity), and market-to-book ratio (M/B) by CEO turnover types.   
The main result of this paper is that firms with more effective internal 
corporate governance are likely to be quicker to terminate CEOs after the initial 
sign of poor firm performance. This result is consistent with the findings in the 
previous literature (for instance Brickley et al. (1988); Weisbach (1988); Morck et 
al. (1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990); Denis, Denis and Sarin (1995); 
Borokhovich et al (1996); Yermack (1996); Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997); Huson 
(2000) ; Perry (2000); Maury (2006); Kato and Long (2006); Conyon and He 
(2008)). Specifically, firms with higher proportion of outside directors, smaller 
board size, greater outside block-holder ownership, and higher incentive-based 
compensation for directors are associated with quicker dismissal of poor-
performing CEOs. These three aspects of corporate governance have been found in 
empirical research to promote effectiveness of the governance system. On the other 
hand, firms with higher managerial as well as CEO ownership and in which CEO 
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is also the Chairman of the board are likely to take a longer time to fire the CEO. 
These features often lead to conflict of interests and partially insulate managers 
from internal monitoring mechanisms.  
The above results prevail even after controlling for three factors that are not 
directly related to internal governance mechanisms----- number of subsidiaries, 
CEO tenure, CEO gender, CEO age. Smaller firms and firms in which the CEO has 
been in the same position for a longer time are likely to be faster in firing their 
CEOs.  
In addition, by dividing CEO turnover into two categories: voluntary vs. 
involuntary CEO turnover based on the reason given by the firm to the news 
media, and internal replacement vs. external replacement, we find that selection of 
outside directors is likely motivated by poor performance. Moreover, outside 
directors tend to outperform inside directors in the pre-turnover period. We also 
test market reaction to CEO turnover announcement. The result suggests that 
involuntary turnovers have sharper decrease in abnormal return compared to 
voluntary turnovers. 
It might be argued that this paper suffers from selection bias. To address this 
issue, we performed d a simple test of selection bias. The result shows that there is 
no evidence of a sample selection problem in estimating the length of removing 
CEOs. In summary, the more effective the internal corporate governance, the 
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shorter the length it takes to get CEO removed following the initial sign of bad 
firm performance.  
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ESSAY 2: DOES PERFORMACE OF THE FORMER FIRM AFFECT A 
CEO’S ABILITY TO FID A IDETICAL POSITIO WITH A 
SUBSEQUET FIRM? 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
Employing a sample of voluntary CEO turnovers selected from S&P 500 
firms over the period 2004-2009, I investigate the impact prior firm performance 
on a CEO’s potential of being hired on an equivalent job in a similar company. I 
find that the better the performance of the previous firm, the quicker is CEO being 
hired. In other words, the better the previous firm performance, the better is the 
CEO’s potential to a land a similar job faster. The result prevails even in the 
presence of control variables, such as the CEO’s education, tenure, age and gender. 
The better performers in previous firms also seem to yield greater improvement in 
performance of their new employers.  
 
 
Key words: CEO characteristics, Firm performance, Quality of CEO 
CEO turnover, Job potentials 
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1. Introduction 
One of the primary roles of a corporate board is to hire a chief executive 
officer (CEO) with superior abilities. An obvious question facing the board is: 
What makes a CEO tick? To put it differently, are there some reliable factors that 
can predict how successful a CEO would be in this position?  However, the 
identification and measurement of CEO ability is a difficult, imprecise and 
expensive process as evidenced by the growing “executive search” industry, and 
the considerable resources that are expended in the CEO search process.  
Many researchers have broached this issue in an attempt to aid the board in 
its CEO-hiring process and identified some objective and relatively easily 
measurable characteristics that might affect a potential CEO’s ability and, as a 
result, strengthen or weaken the chances of him/her being hired as CEO. Four of 
the prominent characteristics are education, tenure, age, and gender of the 
applicant.   Bhagat, Bolton, and Subramanian (2001) find no evidence to support 
their proposition that the higher the level of education, all else the same, the 
superior is the CEO’s ability to perform.  Miller and Shamie (2001) find that it is 
common for managers’ performance to decline later (after 15 years in office) in the 
careers due perhaps to their declining propensity to new experimentation. A similar 
view is shared by Katz (1982), Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin (1988), 
Sonnenfeld (1988); Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992), Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and 
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Fredrickson (1993), Miller (1990), (1991), (1994), Finkelstein and Hambrick 
(1995) and Walsh (1995). Not all scholars associate longer experience of a CEO 
with declining firm performance. For example, Gabarro (1987); and Hambrick and 
Fukutomi (1991) argue that increased knowledge of the organization and superior 
ability to compete actually allow CEOs with longer tenures to perform better. 
Wagner, Pfeffer, and O’Reilly (1984), Salancik and Pfeffer (1985), Boeker (1992); 
and Finkelstein and Hambrick (1995) provide an alternative argument as to why 
CEOs with long experience might perform better. They argue that poor performing 
CEOs are weeded out early and, consequently, mostly stronger performers survive.  
According to Gibbons and Murphy (1992), career concerns of CEOs change with 
age: at younger age, they are not too concerned about their career and are willing 
to take more costly unobservable actions, as the age advances, the CEO’s career 
concerns increase, and finally, concerns fall again as the CEO approaches 
retirement. Thus, the age of the person applying for the CEO position might 
influence the board’s decision to hire him/her.  According to Blease, Elkinawy and 
Stater (2009), female executives are more likely than male executives to resign 
their positions voluntarily but are less likely than men to depart voluntarily as firm 
size increases or board size decreases. Consequently, the gender too might affect a 
candidate’s chance of being hired as CEO.  
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Fee and Hadlock (2003) propose a model of managerial ability that predicts 
a positive relationship between prior firm performance and the likelihood that a 
manager moves to a superior position at another firm. Their evidence is broadly 
consistent with the predictions of the managerial ability model that prior firm 
performance is used by the labor market as a signal of managerial ability- a key 
assumption in many of the career-concerns models.  
Following Fee and Hadlock (2003), I posit in this essay that performance 
record of a CEO with a prior firm is likely to play a dominant role in this person 
being hired in a similar position with a subsequent firm. Specifically, I examine the 
subsequent employment history of persons who voluntarily resign CEO positions 
from the S&P 500 firms during the period 2004-2009. I hypothesize that CEOs 
who performed better during their tenure with preceding firms are likely to more 
quickly find similar jobs with subsequent firms. I define CEO turnover as 
voluntary when a CEO leaves the firm voluntarily and equivalent position as CEO, 
directors of the board, chairman of the board, or founder of a new company. My 
findings are largely consistent with the main hypothesis:  better previous firm 
performance leads to a CEO finding a similar job with a similar company quicker 
(within six months). I also find evidence that these CEOs continue to out-perform 
their slower (between six and 24 months) counterparts in their new place of 
employment. 
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The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides literature 
review.  Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the methodology and 
provides measure of each variable. Section 5 discusses results and Section 6 
presents conclusions. 
2. Literature review 
Previous literature, to our understanding, has not examined how CEO 
characteristics and prior firm performance affect the probability of a person who 
leaves his/her firm voluntarily as a CEO finding an equivalent job at another firm. 
Here I summarize the findings of papers that have examined the characteristics of a 
person who is likely to be hired as a CEO. The following characteristics have often 
cited in the literature as the desired attribute of CEO of a public held company: 
education, tenure, gender and age.  
Bhagat et al (2010) documents that CEO education appears to play an important 
role in the hiring of CEOs. CEO education influences CEO ability in three ways. 
First, education provides CEO knowledge to utilize all the technique and concepts 
into the real world. Second, higher education can help CEOs solve and overcome 
challenges quickly and intelligently. Finally, the social networks acquired in 
college and graduate school can be quite helpful professionally in the future. On 
the other hand, they do not find a significant systematic relationship between CEO 
education and long-term firm performance. It implies that CEO education does not 
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affect the long-term performance of firms. However, CEO education is just one of 
the determinants of CEO ability.  
Miller and Shamie (2001) assert that CEOs’ abilities to make changes may vary 
across their tenures. They document that executive tenure may be associated with 
both good and poor performance—but at different stages of an executive’s career. 
They find that it is common for managers’ performance to decline later in their 
careers. Although some might argue for CEO term limits to counter this tendency, 
they found that decline occurred quite late, usually after 15 years in office. 
Moreover, this decline was associated with a fall in experimentation, a trend that 
might be combated by greater awareness of the problem. Other papers argue that 
CEO knowledge of their organization and its ability to compete helps them to 
contribute to better performance (Gabarro (1987); Hambrick and Fukutomi 
(1991)). Long experience is also said to be associated with success because those 
who perform very poorly tend to be dismissed—mostly the strong survive (Boeker 
(1992); Finkelstein and Hambrick, (1995); Salancik and Pfeffer (1985); Wagner, 
Pfeffer, and O’Reilly (1984)). Other research, however, shows that executives who 
stay on the job too long become ‘stale in the saddle’—overly committed to the 
status and thus less effective ((Finkelstein and Hambrick (1995); Fredrickson, 
Hambrick, and Baumrin (1988); Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992); Hambrick et al 
(1993); Katz (1982); Miller (1990), (1991), (1994); Sonnenfeld (1988); Walsh 
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(1995)). Overall findings suggest that top executives have ability to change firm 
performance based on their tenure. Therefore, tenure may be an important factor to 
be considered during hiring process.  
CEO gender and CEO age may have some influence on hiring decision. 
According to Gibbons and Murphy (1992), younger CEO are willing to take more 
risky actions because of lower career concerns, such as leaving their job 
voluntarily without having a guaranteed job somewhere else. The CEO’s career 
concern sensitivity should increase as the CEO ages (CEO experience). On the 
other hand, there will be fewer career concerns as the CEO is near retirement. 
Therefore, CEO’s career concerns will be high at a certain time of CEOs’ age. 
Another related study by Blease, Elkinawy and Stater (2009) suggests that female 
executives are more likely than male executives to depart their positions 
voluntarily, and women are less likely than men to depart voluntarily as firm size 
increases or board size decreases. Therefore, age and gender may affect a person’s 
potential in job market for CEOs.  
Previous firm performance is also a signal of managerial ability to find a job 
elsewhere after leaving a firm voluntarily. Fee and Hadlock (2003) constructs a 
model of managerial ability that predicts a positive relationship between prior firm 
performance and the likelihood that a manager moves to a superior position at 
another firm, and no apparent relationship between prior firm performance and the 
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likelihood of downward moves to new employers. These findings suggest that 
CEO characteristics and previous firm performance might play an important role in 
the hiring of CEOs. 
3. Sample, Methodology, Variables and Data  
3.1. Sample:  
My sample includes the S&P 500 firms during the period 2004-2009. I collect 
the information about CEO turnovers for these firms from ExecuComp database. 
All CEO turnovers are cross-checked with the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), Wall 
Street Journal Index (WSJI) or both to get exact date of the announcement of the 
change as well as the reason given by the company for the change. I classify all 
CEO turnovers into two categories: voluntary CEO turnovers and involuntary CEO 
turnovers based on the reasons given by the firm to the news media. A CEO 
change is considered as a voluntary CEO turnover when it occurs due to planned 
succession, retirement, voluntary resignation, stepping down, bad health, death, or 
interim replacement. An involuntary turnover occurs when a CEO is fired, forced 
to resign, or resigned due to scandal, accounting conflicts, and poor performance. 
This yields a final sample of 356 CEO turnovers--341 voluntary and 15 
involuntary. Out of the total 341 voluntary turnovers, only 51 are strictly voluntary 
in the sense these turnovers are not related to retirement, death, illness etc. I do not 
find any reference to ten of the 51 CEOs subsequent to their resignation from the 
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previous job and, therefore, use the remaining 41 observations in my sample. 
Twenty two CEOs find an equivalent job within 6 months, and 19 CEOs find an 
equivalent job within 6 to 24 months. 
3.2. Model:  
My main model is as follows: 
The length of time to find a similar job = f (prior firm performance 
and control variables). 
The length of time is a binary variable that equals one if a CEO gets a job at 
another company less than 6 months after she or he leaves the firm voluntarily and 
equals zero otherwise. Following Fee and Hadlock (2003), since potential 
employers will look back over a fairly long period in assessing a CEO's potential 
for their firm, I choose to measure firm performance over the five-year period that 
precedes the executive's departure.  Return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE) 
and market-to-book ratio (M/B) are my primary performance measures. Follow 
Smith (1990); Smith and Watts (1992); Denis & Denis (1995), Yermack (1996); 
Shin and Stulz (1998); Allgood and Farrell (2000); Palia (2000); Anderson and 
Reed (2003), Dezso (2005); Gottesman and Morey (2006)  I define return on assets 
(ROA) as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) 
over the book value of total assets, return on equity (ROE) as earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) over total equity at the start 
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of the year, market-to-book ratio (M/B) as book value of assets plus market value 
of common stock less the book value of common equity. Since operating income 
does not include taxes, dividends, or interest income received, nor any dividends 
paid to stockholders, it is argued to be less subjected to managerial manipulation 
and, therefore, a robust measure of changes in the operating performance of an 
organization (Smith, 1990; Denis & Denis, 1995).  
3.2.1. Control variables 
My control variables are education, tenure, age and gender of the CEO along 
with the industry demand and overall employment scenario in the economy. 
Definition of each variable follows. 
CEO education: Since my sample is small, proxy for CEO education is 
binary variable that takes 1 if a CEO has a master degree or a higher degree, and 0 
otherwise. 
CEO tenure: To be consistent with Denis et al. (1997); Parrino (1997); 
Allgood and Farrell (2000); Goyal and Park (2002)); Bhagat et al (2010), I define 
tenure as the length of time a CEO has served in this capacity prior to joining the 
new firm.  
 CEO age: Following Bhagat et al (2010), I define age as the age the CEO attains 
at the end of the fiscal year in which he/she resigned from the previous company.  
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CEO gender: This is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 when the CEO is 
a male and 0 when the CEO is a female. 
3.2.2. Other Control Variables 
Firm Size: Following Bhagat et al (2010), I use firm size as a control 
variable. Firm size is measured as the natural log of book value of total assets for 
the fiscal year. 
2umber of subsidiaries: I use it as one of the control variables because it is 
more difficult to appraise the CEO’s contribution to the firm’s performance in a 
complex organization (many subsidiaries). Number of subsidiaries is defined as the 
number of 4 digit subsidiaries for each firm.  
Unemployment Rate: The other control variable that I use is the prevailing 
unemployment rate in the economy surrounding the time period when the 
voluntary turnover occur for each CEO. 
Industry Unemployment Rate: I use the industry unemployment rate to 
control for the industry effect. 
I use Probit model to investigate the impact of CEO characteristics (CEO 
education, CEO tenure, CEO age, CEO gender), unemployment rates and prior 
firm performance on CEOs’ potentials of being hired on an equivalent job for the 
case of voluntary CEO turnover: 
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where  
Pr = Length of time to find a similar position with another company: it takes 
on a value of 1 when a CEO obtains an equivalent job within 6 months after 
resigning and  zero when the length of time is between over 6 months but 
equal to or below 24 months.  
Performance of the Prior Company= measured by M/B, ROA, ROE. 
CEO education: is binary variable that equals 1 if a CEO owns at least a 
master degree or higher degree, and 0 otherwise 
CEO tenure: is measured by the number of years that the CEO has been the 
CEO (years) (log of CEO tenure) 
CEO age: is the age of the CEO at the end of the fiscal year (years): log of 
age; 
CEO gender: is binary variable that equals one if a CEO is female, 0 
otherwise 
Unemployment rate (%) when a CEO resigns from the previous company. 
Firm size: is measured as the natural log of book value of total assets for the 
fiscal year 
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Number of subsidiaries: is defined as the number of 4 digit subsidiaries for 
each firm. 
Industry Unemployment Rate (%):  the unemployment rate of the industry to 
which a sample firm belongs. 
Following Gottesman and Morey (2006), I collect information include the 
CEO tenure, age, gender, and educational background for each CEO from the 
Register Executives publication provided by Standard and Poor’s NetAdvantage 
database for S&P 500 firms during the period 2004-2009. CEO tenure, CEO age 
and CEO gender information are also cross-checked from Execucomp, and website 
www.spencerstuart.com. The educational background information provides the 
name of the educational institution where each CEO received their undergraduate 
and graduate degrees, and whether the graduate degree was an MBA, law degree, 
or other graduate degree. To be consistent with Bhagat (2010), if the CEO obtains 
a degree during his/her tenure as CEO, I do not distinguish this as there are very 
few CEOs in this situation. Using Execucomp database, as well as the Compustat 
and CRSP databases, I gather annual operational performance measures such as 
total assets, total sales, M/B, ROA, ROE. Total sales are the net annual sales as 
reported by the company. Return on assets (ROA) is calculated as earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) over the book value of total 
assets, return on equity (ROE) is measured by earnings before interest, tax, 
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depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), divided total equity at the start of the 
year, market-to-book ratio (M/B) is calculated as book vale of assets plus market 
value of common stock less the book value of common equity over book value of 
total assets. Occupational unemployment rates were collected from the Current 
Population Survey’s monthly estimates, at http://ferret.bls.census.gov/cgi-
bin/ferret, consistent with other recent work (Trevor (2001) and Kammeyer (2005)) 
4. Results  
4.1. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the characteristics of the CEOs and 
the firms in which they are employed for the full sample firm experiencing CEO 
turnovers and the sub sample firms experiencing CEO voluntary turnovers. I report 
summary statistics for the full sample firms experiencing CEO turnovers (Panel A) 
as well as firms experiencing CEO voluntary turnovers (Panel B).  These variables 
include CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO gender, firm’s total assets, return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), market-to-book ratio (M/B) and stock industry 
sales. Table 1 show a median CEO age is 54.43 years for the whole sample and 
55.19 for the sub sample which are very close to the recent years
10
. A median CEO 
has served on the board for 5 years. The means indicate that 3.2% of the. 
                                                 
2
 The median age for S&P 500 CEOs is 55 in 2007, and 54 in 2008 
(Source www.spencerstuart.com) 
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observations are female CEO for the full sample, and 3.1% for sub sample. 
Medians on return on assets (ROA) are 11.34% for the sub sample compare to 
11.34% for the full sample. Median on return on equity (ROE) for the full sample 
is 13.25% while it is 13.12% for the sub sample. Market-to-book ratios have a 
median of 2.2 and 2.1 for the full sample and the sub sample, respectively. Firm 
size has a median of 82,376 (millions) for the full sample and 83,372 for the sub 
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sample. A median on industry sales is 75,266 (millions) for the full sample and 
74,877 for the sub sample 
Table 2 presents the reasons for CEO turnovers from 2004-2009. During 
these six years, I identified 356 cases of CEO turnover; of these, 341 (95.79%) are 
voluntary and 15 (4.21%) are forced turnovers. Percentage of voluntary turnovers 
increases from 91.04% in 2004 to 100% in 2011, while that of forced turnovers 
decreases from 8.96% in 2004 to 0% in 2011.  
 
4.2. Market reaction to CEO turnover announcements 
In this section, I examine current firm long-run abnormal stock performance 
around CEO turnovers with a sample of 41 CEO turnovers including 22 CEOs 
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finding a job within 6 months (group 1) and 19 CEOs finding a job within 6 to 24 
months (group 2).  Following Chen (2012), stock returns are measured by a four 
factor model that includes the market risk premium (the spread between CRSP 
value-weighted market return and risk-free rate), SMB (the return spread between 
portfolios of small and big capitalization stocks), HML (the return spread between 
portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks), and a momentum factor. Table 
3 reports average abnormal stock returns over six window periods around the 
announcement [-Q7, -Q1], [-Q4, -Q1], [-Q1], [+Q1], [+Q1, +Q4], [+Q1, +Q7]. The 
market model parameters are estimated with data over the 24-month period seven 
quarters before the turnover announcement quarter. (Insert table 3). Table 3 
suggests that firms in group 2 have sharper decrease in abnormal return compare 
with firms in group 1 in pre-turnover, especially in the period [-Q7, -Q1], [-Q1, -
Q4],. The abnormal returns for group 1 are -15.34% and -12.12%, significant at 
10% and 5% in the period [-Q7, -Q1], [-Q4, -Q1], respectively. The abnormal 
return for group 2 is -17.89%, significant at 5% in the period [-Q7, -Q1]; however 
it is not significant in the period [-Q4, -Q1]. Their abnormal stock performance 
improves in the post-turnover period for both groups, which is consistent with 
Denis and Denis (1995), Huson et al (2004)). The abnormal return for group 1 is 
3.13%, significant at 1% in the period [+Q1, +Q4].The abnormal return for group 2 
is 2.78%, significant at 10% [+Q1, +Q4]. However, the abnormal returns for group 
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1 are significant higher then abnormal returns for group 2. The abnormal returns 
for both groups are not significant in the periods [-Q1] and [+Q1]. It indicates that 
the market does not react immediately a quarter before and a quarter after to the 
CEO turnover announcement. 
 
4.3. Previous firm performance and time it takes to find an equivalent job 
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As 
Table 4 shows, there is a positive association between prior firm performance and 
CEO’s potentials of getting hired (coefficient = 0.03721, significant at 1% in 
column 1, coefficient = 0.02562, significant at 5% in column 2, coefficient = 
0.00778, significant at 10% in column 3). Higher returns on assets (ROA), higher 
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return on equity (ROE) and higher market-to-book ratio (M/B) increase the 
probability of CEOs finding an equivalent job, consistent with the findings of 
Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004). My findings therefore support the notion 
that CEOs are likely to more quickly find the employment under conditions of 
strong previous firm performance
11
. 
Column 1, 2, and 3 in the table 4 shows that coefficients on CEO education 
are 0.03190, 0.02211 and 0.00157 which are positive and significant at 5%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. It suggests that CEOs with master degree or higher degree 
can find an equivalent job faster than those who do not. In other word, the higher 
the CEO education, the faster of being hired. This result is consistent with the 
previous hypothesis. There is a positive association between CEO’s experience 
(CEO tenure) and CEO’s potentials of getting a job (the coefficients are 0.00238 in 
column 1 and 0.00469 in column 2, significant at 5% and 10%). It indicates that 
the more experience CEO have, the faster they can be hired on an equivalent job. 
However, there is no effect of CEO age and CEO gender on their potentials of 
finding a job since the coefficient is not significant. In addition, I also investigate 
the interaction between CEO gender and firm size. However, the coefficients are 
not significant. The chance of CEOs getting a job depends on the market condition. 
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The result tells that when the job market is down (higher unemployment rates), the 
chance of CEOs being hired is less likely that when the job market is up (lower 
unemployment rates).  
There is no interaction between CEO tenure and CEO age to CEO’s 
potential of being hired since the coefficient is not significant. Coefficient on firm 
size are 0.01773, significant at 10% in column 1, 0.00936 significant at 5% in 
column 2 , 0.01556 significant at 10% in column 3, which indicates that firm size 
has a positive effect on CEO’s potentials of being hired, which suggests that CEOs 
in larger firms are more mobile in the market. Coefficients on industry 
unemployment rate are not significant; therefore there is no industry effect on 
CEOs’ potentials of getting an equivalent job somewhere else. 
 
Table 5 compares the performance of previous firms for the two groups –the group 
that finds job within 6 months and the group that takes longer. It shows that on 
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average, firms associated with group 1 significantly outperform the firms 
associated with group 2.  
4.4. Relative Performance of the new firms associated with two groups 
 
Table 6 shows that the performance of new firms improves with the hire of new 
CEOs. However, the improvement rendered by the first group (the CEOs who find 
jobs within 6 months) is higher than that of the second group.  
Table 7 demonstrates that CEO characteristics, in general, have relatively 
low or no impact on the performance of new firms, with the exception of CEO-
tenure which has statistically significant positive impact on performance of new 
firms.  
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6. Conclusions. 
By using the Probit model I investigate the impact of CEO characteristics 
and previous firm performance on their potentials of being hired on an equivalent 
job in case of S&P 500 firms during the period 2004-2009. I found that the better 
the quality of CEOs, the faster they can find an equivalent job somewhere else, and 
the better the previous firm performance, the higher chance of them getting an 
equivalent job. Specifically, a CEO with a master degree or a higher degree can get 
a job faster than a CEO who does not. The more CEO’s experience, the more 
potentials of them being hired on an equivalent job. Older CEOs with higher 
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experience are more likely being hired faster. Female CEOs are less likely to get a 
job as fast as male CEOs due to the fact that male CEOs are more mobile and 
active in the job market than female CEOs. I also found that there are abnormal 
returns around CEO turnover announcement, which indicates that the market is 
very sensitive and reacts to the CEO turnover announcement immediately. 
In addition, I test the relationship between CEO characteristics and current 
firm performance. There is a positive association between CEO tenure and current 
firm performance in the case of using ROA (return on assets) as proxy for firm 
performance. The rest of results show that there is no evidence of the relationship 
between CEO education, CEO age, CEO gender and current firm performance. 
The reason might be that the proxies of CEO characteristics are not correct or I 
have not controlled appropriately for variables. This suggests that future research 
can look at this by using appropriate proxies for CEO characteristics and control 
for the right variables. 
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